Governor Ademola Adeleke’s decision to support President Bola Ahmed Tinubu’s re-election in 2027, despite remaining outside the APC, offers the South-East a political lesson it should not ignore. Adeleke has made it clear that he is not contemplating defection to the APC and has also denied any political agreement with Tinubu before the Osun election. Yet, after defeating the APC in his state, he is prepared to support Tinubu for another term. That is politics beyond party labels.
The development raises a fundamental question about the way different regions pursue political interests. In the South-West, political disagreements do not necessarily erase the larger regional calculation. A politician can fight the APC at home, defeat its candidate and still recognise the political importance of supporting a fellow Yoruba man at the national level. That is the kind of strategic thinking that turns regional identity into political leverage.
Now consider the South-East. There are five governors in the region, belonging to different political parties, and none is required to abandon his party to support Peter Obi, an Igbo man and one of the strongest presidential contenders from the South-East. Why, then, is it so difficult for the governors to maintain their respective party identities while collectively supporting Obi’s presidential bid? Supporting Obi does not necessarily require them to defect from the APC, PDP, LP or any other party; it requires them to recognise the strategic importance of producing a strong political voice for the region.
And this is where the argument becomes uncomfortable. Peter Obi is not merely another politician from the South-East. He has demonstrated national appeal, has built a political movement that extends beyond the region and, crucially, has the capacity to mount a serious challenge for the presidency in 2027. If the South-East genuinely believes that Obi has a realistic chance of winning, then supporting him should not be reduced to sentiment; it should be treated as a political calculation about representation, bargaining power and the future influence of the region.
The irony is difficult to miss. A Yoruba governor who fought against the APC can openly declare support for a Yoruba president without joining the APC, while five South-East governors cannot appear to find a common political position around an Igbo presidential contender with national support. The question is not whether the governors should surrender their political parties. The question is whether party loyalty should permanently prevent a region from pursuing what it considers its larger political interest.
The South-East therefore needs to confront itself before blaming everyone else for its political weakness. Other regions have demonstrated that political competition can coexist with strategic regional calculation; the South-East must decide whether it wants to continue with fragmented interests or develop the political discipline required to negotiate from a position of strength. Adeleke’s position has exposed the question. Why can the South-East governors not remain in their various political parties and still support Peter Obi?
